Attackers have spent at least a month trying to exploit a critical flaw in ConnectWise ScreenConnect against managed service providers (MSPs), according to a report published by Huntress on November 16, 2026. The security firm said it saw at least 688,000 malicious “run file” requests hit 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers between October 20 and November 16, coming from 29 IP addresses.
The bug, CVE-2026-84869, sits in the ScreenConnect client that technicians use to join remote support sessions. It lets a guest in a session push a file to the technician’s computer and have it run without the technician’s approval. Huntress confirmed that at least one MSP technician’s workstation was fully taken over through the flaw.
A client-side flaw patched in September
ConnectWise disclosed the issue in a September 8 security bulletin. It said a condition in the ScreenConnect client “may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation in certain circumstances.” The flaw carries a CVSS score of 9.9 and is classed as missing authorization and improper privilege management. All versions before 26.6.5 are affected.
ConnectWise said ScreenConnect servers themselves are not affected. That detail matters, because patching the server alone does not fix the problem. Technicians’ host clients must be reinstalled and Access agents updated to 26.6.5 or later. Cloud instances were upgraded automatically, but host clients still need reinstalling. As a temporary step, ConnectWise suggests removing the TransferFiles permission from every user role.
CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 11, with a federal deadline of September 14. The catalog lists known ransomware use as “Unknown.”
Spraying servers and waiting for a technician
Huntress said the attackers appear to be spraying servers blindly. Attacker-controlled guest sessions, often with blank names or default Windows hostnames, repeatedly asked the technician’s client to run files named update.bat or update_ followed by eight hex characters. The requests keep coming in case a technician joins the session. On the busiest server, 10 guest sessions from seven IP addresses made 70,414 requests over three weeks.
A technician only has to join the session, whether the attacker created it or slipped into a real customer session as an extra guest. No prompt appears. Huntress noted that a technician’s workstation typically holds remote monitoring and management (RMM) consoles, saved credentials and access to every customer the MSP supports.
A full compromise in about 9 seconds
On November 12, Huntress watched the attack succeed. Shortly before noon Eastern time, a technician joined a blank-named Access session, and their client ran a guest-pushed file named update_224ac089.bat. Within about 9 seconds, the script hid itself, reported the new victim to the attacker through a Telegram bot, ran basic checks on the system and downloaded an installer from an attacker-controlled domain. It then started a rebranded ScreenConnect client called WindowsUpdate.WindowsClient.exe that connected to the attacker’s own relay server.
Huntress tied this compromise to the wider spray. The same update_224ac089.bat file was sprayed at five MSP servers 43 minutes before the takeover, and three of them were still receiving it on November 16. Huntress said it has high confidence that the spray operator and the operator of the payload domain are the same.
Huntress described other activity as well:
- Hours later, a technician at a second MSP had their client run a harmless
marker.txtfile pushed by a guest. Huntress believes this was a “canary” test to confirm the exploit worked. - In October, an attacker joined three real customer support sessions at one MSP and tried to drop a
Sync.batscript into technicians’ Windows Startup folders using a path traversal trick. - At least four more technicians were exposed to guest-pushed files in October.
Huntress said many technicians in these cases were still on 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the fix was released.
Separate ScreenConnect campaigns
Huntress said this activity is distinct from a campaign it reported on November 13 that planted unauthorized guest sessions disguised with crypto exchange names on more than 100 MSP ScreenConnect servers. Huntress has not named a threat actor for the spray campaign, and no ransomware deployment or customer data theft has been publicly tied to it.
MSP tools have been a frequent target this year. ConnectWise was previously hit by a supply chain attack that reached Microsoft 365 customers, and N-able took N-central offline after a researcher published exploits for alleged zero-days.
What MSPs should do now
Huntress recommends that MSPs:
- Update every technician’s ScreenConnect host client and any Access agents to
26.6.5or later, and remove theTransferFilespermission until that is done. - Review the server’s session database for guest-sent “run file” events, especially repeated
update*.batrequests, and check whether a technician was connected at the same time. - Look on technician workstations for the ScreenConnect client running scripts from its Temp folder, unexpected Startup items, and any ScreenConnect client pointing to a relay the MSP does not own.
- If a hit is found, isolate the workstation and rotate every credential it could reach, including RMM, PSA, ScreenConnect, password vault and customer admin accounts.
The full Huntress report lists the attacker domain, file hashes and sprayer IP addresses. Our guide on how organizations can prevent ransomware attacks covers broader steps for locking down remote access tools.












